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Abstract 
 
Bilateral Spanish-Basque relations over the Basque model of near fiscal autonomy 
(Concierto Económico or Economic Agreement) have been characterized by more 
tension than harmony since the 1980s. The main source of discord lies in different 
conceptions of the model: while the Basque nationalists seek increasing fiscal 
autonomy verging on sovereignty within Europe, Spanish governments see it as a 
form of fiscal decentralization within Spain remaining subordinate to Spanish 
legislation. These different conceptions cannot easily co-exist in a loose relationship 
of mutual tolerance because the development of the model continues to bring them 
into conflict, feeding into the broader political clash over how best to accommodate 
the Basque region within or with Spain.  
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           The extensive transfer of policy competences to the governments of Spain’s 17 
autonomous communities (ACs or regions) since the 1980s has outweighed the 
transfer of revenue-raising powers in all but two ACs – the Basque Country (Euskadi) 
and Navarre. The latter two have economic agreements with the Spanish state named 
the Concierto Económico and the Convenio Económico respectively (hereafter 
Concierto and Convenio), which grant them near fiscal autonomy. In contrast, the 
remaining fifteen ACs are subject to an intergovernmental revenue-sharing system 
called the common financing regime (régimen común de financiación), which 
involves a combination of revenue transfers from the central government and more 
limited regional taxation powers. The existence of two distinct regional financing 
systems and the differences in levels of regional financing and contributions to inter-
regional solidarity that ACs experience under these have fed into growing 
intergovernmental conflict and competition in Spain since the turn of the century. In 
particular, Catalan grievances over the amount the region contributes to the rest of 
Spain under the common system are widely acknowledged to have contributed to the 
broader deterioration in Spanish-Catalan relations, especially during the financial 
crisis from 2008 onwards.1  
            The fact that the Concierto has given the Basque region greater control over its 
finances and has proved comparatively favourable to it in terms of resources per 
capita, as well as being based on strictly bilateral relations with Madrid without inter-
regional negotiations, explains why regional financing in the Basque case has not 
become a visceral point of contention as in Catalonia. Yet the predominant focus in 
both the media and academia on the politicized debate over whether or not the 
Concierto is therefore a “privilege” in comparison with the common financing regime 
has neglected a fuller analysis of the question of why the Concierto itself still has not 
produced consensus between Spanish governments and the Partido Nacionalista 
Vasco (PNV, Basque Nationalist Party), the preeminent party in the Basque region 
since Spain’s transition to democracy.2 Hence, the question posed here is: Why has 
the bilateralism that characterizes the Concierto resulted in more tension than 
harmony in Spanish-Basque fiscal and financial relations since the 1980s?  
           The bilateral nature of the Concierto has helped to mitigate the problem of 
inter-regional competition for resources that afflicts the common financing system 
and also of the perceived dominance of Madrid in wider Basque-Spanish political 
relations. The Concierto law and other legislation deriving from it (fundamentally the 
five-yearly quota laws governing the Basque contribution to the Spanish state) require 
mutual agreement between Basque and Spanish government delegations, both of 
which have equal veto power. The legislation is then always presented to the Spanish 
parliament as a single act, thus it can only be accepted or rejected without being 
subject to parliamentary debate and potential amendment. These features make the 
Concierto the closest current equivalent to the form of “bilateral relationship between 
equals” that the PNV seeks in wider Spanish-Basque political relations, under the 
party’s latest iteration of its recurring desire to seek a new political relationship with 
Madrid based on a more confederal model involving “self-determination” and co-
sovereignty. Following the PNV’s frustrated attempt under former head of the Basque 
government (lehendakari) Juan José Ibarretxe to turn the Basque region into a semi-
independent associated state of Spain in 2001-2005, this notion of co-sovereignty has 
since been reconstrued under lehendakari Iñigo Urkullu to envisage an extension of 
the “pacted” nature of the economic Concierto to wider political relations, with 
explicit calls for a “political Concierto”.3  
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           Nevertheless, the bilateral nature of the Concierto frequently fails to work 
smoothly in practice, resulting in more discord than agreement. Since the first 
Conciertos were agreed with the Basque provinces of Araba/Álava, Bizkaia and 
Gipuzkoa back in 1878, the model has proved surprisingly adaptable to the times, and 
never more so than in the almost 35 years since the first Concierto of the democratic 
period was approved in 1981. And yet this has also led to strikingly different 
perspectives on what the model can and should be, even within the self-proclaimedly 
pro-Concierto camp: where some continue to see a taxation model subject to and 
adapted to Spanish legislation, others now envisage more fully-fledged fiscal 
sovereignty, in which the Basque provinces would be sovereign in fiscal matters 
within Europe to more or less the same degree as the Spanish state, rather than being 
subordinate to it.4 From the turn of the century in particular, there emerged a growing 
rift in perspectives as to how the Concierto should be developed in a changing 
regulatory context with the addition of the supranational European sphere, which had 
not featured when the Concierto of 1981 was negotiated. Discrepancies in the views 
of successive Spanish and Basque governments have fed into the broader clash in 
views over the degree of autonomy that Euskadi should be afforded within the 
Spanish state. A certain irony thus emerges whereby the PNV is touting the bilateral 
nature of the Concierto as an exemplary basis for a new Basque-Spanish political 
relationship and yet disagreements over the Concierto’s development also contribute 
to the wider dissatisfaction fuelling this very search for new pro-sovereignty political 
formulas outlined in the introduction to this collection.  
           Some clarification of terms is required here, since the definitions of and 
distinction between fiscal autonomy and fiscal sovereignty are not clear-cut. In brief, 
fiscal autonomy when applied to subcentral governments usually describes a large 
degree of freedom in raising and spending taxes but still within the boundaries of 
some rules set by the wider state, as is currently true of Euskadi. Fiscal sovereignty, 
meanwhile, is more often applied to states themselves and suggests complete 
autonomy in setting fiscal policies without any outside interference. In practice, 
complete fiscal sovereignty has now become almost obsolete in Europe since 
individual member states are subject to some wider European fiscal legislation. Here, 
however, fiscal sovereignty when applied to the Basque provinces describes the 
aspiration to reach the same level of sovereignty in setting tax structures and policies 
in most respects as held by Spain itself. Representatives of the Basque institutions 
refer to the provinces as fiscally sovereign already in the case of taxes for which they 
have been granted full regulatory autonomy.  
           This study starts with an account of the main features of the Concierto and the 
origins of the discrepancy in conceptions over the model. It then examines three of the 
main longstanding areas of Basque-Spanish contention over the Concierto: the debate 
over the Basque contribution to inter-regional solidarity; disputes over Basque-
Spanish corporation tax differences; and differing views on how to update the 
Concierto within the regulatory context of the European Union. This is followed by an 
analysis of whether the bilateral nature of the Concierto has helped to resolve the 
discrepancies in these fundamental areas of contention, investigating the impact of the 
main factors on the bilateral relationship, namely political alliances, party ideology, 
inter-regional competition and the state of the economy. Finally, the concluding 
section considers the implications of the growing difficulty in reconciling different 
conceptions of the Concierto for the future of Spanish-Basque fiscal and financial 
relations.  
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The Basque fiscal model: workings, origins and conceptions 
 
           Under the Concierto, the Basque provinces (also known as “historical 
territories” and “foral territories”) are responsible both for collecting almost all taxes 
and for regulating the majority of them. The Basque government uses these tax 
revenues to cover the costs of the policy competences it has assumed (which include 
the most fundamental areas of public services such as health and education) and also 
to pay an annual quota (cupo) to the Spanish government towards the few non-
assumed competences for which the Spanish state remains responsible (e.g. foreign 
and defence policy). The quota covers 6.24% of the share of the Spanish state budget 
for these general expenses covered by tax revenues, broadly in line with the region’s 
share of Spain’s GDP. The Basque AC comprises three provinces (Araba/Álava, 
Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa), which each have their own treasury. A relatively small share 
of the total tax revenues they raise is used to pay the quota, which in recent years has 
accounted for around 8%-15% of the Basque annual budget. The remaining revenues 
go towards the common resources of the Basque region, approximately 70% of which 
are passed upwards to the regional government to cover its competences, while the 
rest are split between the diputaciones (provincial governments) and the local or 
municipal authorities. The internal organization of the region is thus essentially 
confederal in nature.5  
            Following the transition to democracy, this system of near fiscal autonomy in 
the Basque Country and also Navarre became known as the régimen foral or 
foral/charter regime (from fuero or medieval charter), in contrast to the régimen 
común which was developed for the other autonomous communities. Under its First 
Additional Disposition, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 pledged to respect the 
historical rights of the “foral territories”, which was fundamentally taken as a 
reference to the historical tradition of the Basque and Navarran provinces in raising 
their own taxes. In the Basque case, the Basque and Spanish authorities reached an 
agreement in 1980 (approved by law in 1981) to restore the Concierto to the provinces 
of Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa (after General Franco had abolished it there in 1937) and 
update it for Araba/Álava (which, along with Navarre, had retained its Concierto by 
supporting the Francoist side). While the three Basque provinces retained their 
responsibility for tax collection, for the first time they would combine to pay one 
single Basque quota to Madrid following the creation of the autonomous community.  
           The Concierto of 1981 marked a significant departure from its predecessors, 
most notably in the design of the quota, the size of which had previously been based 
on what the Spanish treasury believed it would hypothetically raise in tax revenues 
were it collecting in the provinces. This was because Spain had originally conceded to 
the arrangement in 1878 primarily for practical reasons since the central treasury did 
not immediately have the technical means or capacity to collect taxes in the Basque 
provinces after the abolition of their fueros or legal charters in 1876 following the 
Basque defeat in the Third Carlist War. The arrangement was also fundamentally 
designed to appease the Basque liberal oligarchy of the time by allowing them to 
secure beneficial tax deals with the central government. A vestige of the “fueros” in 
economic terms thus remained while any political dimension in the form of self-
government had been abolished. The agreement was originally intended to be a 
temporary one for a transitional period of eight years until the Basque provinces 
became fully integrated into the Spanish tax system, but instead ended up staying in 
force thereafter.6  
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          The Basque Concierto of 1981, which was set to expire on 31 December 2001, 
was updated in 2002 with a new permanent agreement. Every time Spain introduces a 
new tax or modifies an existing one, this calls for bilateral negotiations to be held with 
a Basque delegation to agree if and how to delegate the relevant tax-raising power, 
deciding whether the Basque provincial treasuries will have the authority to regulate 
the tax or only to collect it.7 Under the current legislation, they collect almost all taxes 
and have almost full regulatory autonomy to design the main direct taxes (income, 
wealth, corporation, inheritance and non-resident taxes) and the minor indirect taxes 
(capital transfer tax and stamp duty, and gaming duties). They only lack regulatory 
autonomy in the main indirect taxes (VAT and excises), which account for around 
90% of total indirect tax revenues and are determined by the Spanish state, within the 
narrow parameters set by EU legislation. Within their regulatory capacity, the Basque 
provinces are still subject to some general harmonization rules within the Spanish 
state, as follows: they must adhere to the international agreements signed by Spain; 
they must not distort competition among firms or free movement among Spanish 
regions; and fiscal pressure (tax to GDP ratio) in the provinces should be “equivalent” 
to that in the rest of Spain. The latter two of these principles are, however, inherently 
ambiguous and open to different interpretations. 
           The Concierto receives cross-party support from the two main statewide 
parties, the Partido Popular (PP, Popular Party) and the Partido Socialista Obrero 
Español (PSOE, Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party), as well as the PNV. In the case of 
the statewide parties, however, their respective Basque federations almost always 
support measures pertaining to the Concierto in the Basque parliament that are at 
times then rejected by their colleagues in Madrid due to wider implications for other 
regions in Spain, which can cause internal party contradictions. This also gives the 
PNV the opportunity to present itself as the only true defender of the Concierto and, 
in the view of the Basque PP, to appropriate it as a nationalist instrument of fiscal 
sovereignty.8 This goes to the heart of the fundamental debate between the Basque PP 
and the PNV over the Concierto, both of which consider themselves the party the 
most supportive of the model but conceive of it differently. While the Basque PP sees 
it as a decentralized fiscal model subject to the Spanish tax system and legislation, the 
PNV has come to envisage it as an instrument of fiscal sovereignty in its own right. 
             The roots of the current day discrepancy date back to the afore-mentioned 
origins of the Concierto itself. While the Basque PP takes the starting point of the 
Concierto as the agreements of 1878 with the Basque provinces spearheaded by their 
predecessors among the liberal elites and in Álava in particular (a historical 
stronghold of the Spanish right), the Basque nationalists look further back, 
remembering the Conciertos as the last vestige of what had originally been a wider set 
of political rights based on mutual equality governing the relationship between Spain 
(or previously Castile) and the Basque provinces. In opposition to the PNV’s 
conception of the Concierto as an instrument of fiscal sovereignty for the Basque 
region as a whole (albeit respecting the role of the provinces as home to the 
treasuries), the Basque PP also issues a reminder that the three Basque provinces have 
only shared a Concierto agreement since 1981, which in itself was aided by the fact 
that the Concierto had never been abolished in Álava. Even among the parties who 
consider themselves supporters of the Concierto, conceptions of the model and its 
ultimate aim and purpose thus differ. The Concierto of 1981 in effect combined pre- 
and post-1878 conceptions, for example the requirement for “pacted” bilateral 
agreement was based more on the original fueros than the first Conciertos.    
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The solidarity debate 
 
            The Concierto has been subject to a growing number of attacks from both PP 
and socialist politicians in other ACs and from the most centralist party Unión 
Progreso y Democracia (UPyD, Union Progress and Democracy) founded in 2007 – 
the only statewide party actively to oppose the Concierto even in the Basque 
Country.9 This is primarily on account of the fact that the Basques do not contribute 
to the equalization mechanism for financing public services included in the common 
regime, which is seen to reduce their contribution to inter-regional redistribution. The 
resources the Basque AC receives are based on its regional fiscal capacity since, 
broadly speaking, it keeps all its tax revenues except for those used to pay the quota to 
the central government, which only uses a very small share of Basque tax revenues. 
Since the Basque Country and Navarre are relatively rich regions whose GDP per 
capita is among the highest in Spain, a system in which their resources are based on 
their own fiscal capacity rather than estimated needs (as in the common regime) gives 
them greater resources. This contributes to a level of per capita financing at least 
50%-60% higher than the average of the other fifteen regions.10  
           The quota does include a contribution to the Inter-Territorial Compensation 
Fund, which is designed ultimately to achieve inter-regional income redistribution by 
promoting development in less prosperous regions and was originally envisaged 
during the transition to democracy as the main means of inter-regional solidarity. 
However, this Fund is small since its purpose was later taken over in part by EU 
structural and cohesion funds and it also ended up acquiring a much more secondary 
role in terms of inter-regional redistribution in Spain compared to the financial flows 
involved in the equalization mechanism for financing public services in the common 
regime.11  
           The quota, although it only accounts for a small proportion of Basque tax 
revenues, is also usually interpreted as fulfilling a redistributive purpose since the 
Basque contribution towards non-assumed competences is broadly in line with its 
share of Spain’s GDP (6%-7%) rather than population (4%-5%). Basque politicians 
often point out as much whenever the Concierto comes under political attack. 12 
Nevertheless, the 6.24% figure agreed in 1981 was not explicitly designed to 
incorporate a solidarity component.13 Indeed, under the “quota system” (sistema de 
cupo), the PNV has consistently maintained since the 1980s that the 6.24% should 
apply to financial flows in both directions – not only to the Basque contribution to the 
competences fulfilled by the Spanish state, but also to the Basque share of any funds 
from the Spanish state to fulfil specific competences (often deducted from the quota) 
– thus confirming that it does not strictly envisage the 6.24% as a solidarity 
contribution.  
           There is however a significant other side to the coin which the Basque parties 
supportive of the Concierto seek to emphasize. Most notably, the unilateral risk which 
the fiscal model involves for the Basque region and the lack of any guaranteed 
minimum revenue from the central government encourages accountability and 
responsibility. The size of the quota does not depend on what the Basque provincial 
treasuries collect but rather on the size of the Spanish state budget for non-assumed 
competences, which encourages efficiency since the Basque region loses out if its 
own tax collection increases more slowly (or decreases more quickly) than that of the 
Spanish state. This contrasts with the convoluted revenue-sharing arrangements under 
the common regime, in which the regions have greater spending than revenue-raising 
competences – a form of fiscal decentralization which creates an accountability gap 
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and encourages substate governments to seek further funds from the central 
government to cover over-spending.14  
           Indeed, the level of responsibility the Concierto thus entails combined with the 
potentially onerous and unpopular nature of tax collection contributed to deterring any 
other region including Catalonia from seeking a similar model during the Transition.15 
Calls for a fiscal pact for Catalonia only started to surface later, from the late 1990s 
onwards, but even then Catalan politicians would consistently seek a bilateral deal of 
their own rather than an exact replica of the Concierto in part since they have opposed 
the form of unilateral risk the latter entails and wished instead to ensure a guaranteed 
minimum level of funding – especially since Catalonia accounts for a much larger 
share of Spain’s GDP (18-20%).  
           In the context of the recent financial crisis, clashes between these 
interpretations of the Concierto and the resources it provides reached new heights. 
The Basque region weathered the crisis far better than most other regions in Spain due 
to a number of factors, not least since it had prioritised developing an industry-based 
economy centred on exports in recent decades and avoided the domestic-focused 
construction boom that prevailed elsewhere in Spain before collapsing. The 
accountability the model fosters also discouraged overspending in the boom years, 
unlike in many regions under the common regime where spending increased, current 
income was insufficient to cover current expenditure, and the regional authorities 
would look to the central government for extra funds and the regional savings banks 
(cajas de ahorros) for loans to cover the gap – until the crisis hit, the central 
government was no longer so forthcoming with funds, and most of the savings banks 
collapsed. While the central government had to set up various mechanisms from 2012 
onwards to lend money under strict budgetary compliance conditions to numerous 
cash-strapped regions under the common regime unable to cover their needs or access 
any other financing sources, the Basque region remained self-sufficient.16 There is 
little common ground between those who attribute this relatively healthier financial 
position fundamentally to better economic decisions and financial management by the 
Basque institutions under the Concierto in comparison with the behaviour of the 
common regime ACs, and those who suggest the Basques unfairly receive surplus 
financing through the Concierto in comparison to other comparable regions under the 
common regime. Accusations of surplus financing not only relate to the lack of 
contribution to the equalization mechanism for financing services discussed here, but 
also to other features such as the valuation of non-assumed competences and the VAT 
adjustment rate, both of which are interpreted by critics as overly favourable to the 
Basque region.17  
 
Corporation tax: interpreting harmonization 
 
           Interpretation of the harmonization criteria has created another substantial area 
of controversy in Basque-Spanish fiscal relations, particularly in relation to the 
Basque use of corporation tax. Conflicts over harmonization between Spain and the 
Basque region increased drastically as the Concierto was developed and Basque fiscal 
competences grew. The series of tax incentives, deductions and exemptions – which 
became known as “tax holidays” – for newly established firms that the Basque 
provinces introduced in the 1990s to encourage startups and investment, combined 
with the tendency to introduce a lower corporation tax rate than that of the Spanish 
state, led to an unprecedented number of legal challenges arguing that the ambiguous 
“principle of no distortion” was being infringed to create unfair competition. Such 
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challenges came not only from the Spanish state itself but also from the governments 
of the surrounding Spanish regions as well as trade unions and business associations 
based in them. The conflicts also went beyond the internal sphere of the Spanish state 
to reach the EU institutions.18 The fundamental issue at stake throughout has been the 
fine line between uniformization and harmonization, with the Spanish institutions 
interpreting the latter more restrictively than their Basque counterparts. 
           The fact that the fiscal policies of the Basque provincial treasuries became 
subject to far greater legal challenges within Spain than those presented against the 
fiscal policies of the neighbouring uniprovincial Navarre region with its Convenio (or 
indeed any other AC under the common regime) was in part due to their different 
regulatory status. Under the Spanish Constitution, provincial assemblies can only pass 
regulations (reglamentos), which can be challenged in the administrative courts by 
any number of agents whose interests the regulation affects. In contrast, the Spanish 
and regional parliaments pass laws (leyes) that can only be challenged in Spain’s 
Constitutional Court by a very limited number of institutions and officials listed in 
Article 162 of the Constitution. As a result, corporation tax deductions and incentives 
passed by the Basque Juntas Generales (Basque provincial parliaments) became 
subject to continuous litigation from neighbouring regions (especially La Rioja) and 
business associations and trade unions within them, in addition to the Spanish state. 
The PNV-led Basque government therefore presented a draft bill to the Spanish 
parliament, following unanimous cross-party approval in the Basque parliament in 
June 2007, aiming to secure legal status and protection for the tax and fiscal rules 
adopted by the Basque Juntas Generales. This is what became known – rather 
unfortunately – as the Ley de Blindaje (“Shield Law”).19 Both the PP and the PSOE in 
Madrid opposed PNV approaches on the subject from 2005 onwards due to the 
implications for other regions in Spain, despite the full support of their respective 
Basque delegations for such a measure, until the law was finally approved under the 
PSOE government in 2010.  
           While the Ley de Blindaje would prevent agents at regional level in Spain from 
continuing to challenge Basque fiscal measures, the full scope of the problem over 
corporation tax cuts and incentives was nevertheless much wider, encompassing 
conflicts with the Spanish state and indeed the European Union. From the Basque 
government perspective, Spanish state challenges against Basque fiscal policies have 
in large part been politically motivated, exacerbated by the fact that the final arbitrers 
in many cases, Spain’s Supreme and Constitutional Courts, are known for their 
political bias towards the Spanish government. On the other hand, critics argue that 
the Basque institutions have exacerbated tensions by almost always waiting until the 
Spanish government approves a fiscal reform for Spain and then introducing its own 
with comparatively lower corporation tax rates (the latest Basque fiscal reform in 
2013 which preceded its Spanish counterpart in 2014 was the first notable exception). 
Political opponents of the PNV and some independent economists have also 
suggested that the nationalists were too aggressive with their “tax holiday” legislation 
in the 1990s or at least made a fundamental error in failing to notify the European 
Commission appropriately, in what some interpret as a misjudged bid to assert 
political and fiscal autonomy from Spain.20 The European Commission later ruled in 
2001 that the main tax incentives the Basque provincial treasuries had introduced in 
the 1990s were unlawful state aids, ordering Spain to recover the aids from the 
beneficiaries.  
           Gaining appropriate recognition of the Basque taxation powers at European 
level has been fraught with difficulties given the unique nature of such a developed 
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model of fiscal autonomy within a wider member state. When the Supreme Court of 
Justice of the Basque Country presented the case of the Basque provinces to the 
Luxembourg Court in 1997, seeking clarification as to whether the tax incentives they 
had introduced in 1993 were compatible with the Treaty of European Union, lawyer 
General Saggio’s conclusion that such measures could be considered a territorially 
selective state aid since they only applied to one region (the Basque Country) within a 
wider state (Spain) threatened the capacity of the Basque provinces to set any 
corporation tax rates or incentives even minimally different from those of the Spanish 
state. The situation changed, however, with the Azores tax ruling of 2006. This had 
clear implications for the Basque region, supporting the Basque right to set different 
corporation tax rates from the Spanish treasury within certain parameters, due to the 
region’s compliance with the requirements of procedural, institutional and economic 
autonomy. The EU rulings against the Basque tax holidays of the 1990s still stood 
nevertheless since the incentives were deemed incompatible with fair competition in 
the common market.  
           The Azores ruling and the Ley de Blindaje have helped to reduce the culture of 
litigation over Basque corporation tax measures (often refered to as the 
“judicialization” of the Concierto) and given these a stronger legal standing within 
both Spain and Europe, but from the PNV’s perspective they alone are insufficient. 
Discrepancies in the interpretation of harmonization between the Spanish state and the 
Basque provinces persist, as do perceptions of a biased Spanish legal system. There 
remains a clash in perspectives between those who advocate that the Basque 
provinces should have the same capacity over corporation tax as each individual EU 
member state, and those in favour of greater harmonization with Spanish legislation.  
The Concierto in the EU  
 
             Looking ahead, the PNV-led Basque government and technical experts within 
the provincial treasury departments seek to develop the fiscal autonomy model to take 
full account of the European and wider international context. One of the main 
aspirations since the turn of the century has been to gain representation within the 
Spanish delegation in European and international fora on fiscal affairs. During the 
2001 negotiations for a new Concierto agreement, this became the main source of 
conflict with the Spanish PP government. The Basque delegation proposed the Basque 
institutions should participate in Spain’s preparatory meetings for the Economic and 
Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) and the Spanish delegation to the ECOFIN 
working groups and meetings. The Spanish negotiating team, however, wanted 
instead to include the Basque participation within the general framework for the 
participation of the ACs in EU matters, through the Sectoral Conference designated 
for that purpose (established in Law 2/1997 of 13 March), which gives the ACs a 
weaker legal status and no direct representation in Europe. Ultimately it was the 
Basque side that had to back down temporarily to enable the new Concierto to be 
approved belatedly in May 2002 under Law 12/2002. The issue of representation in 
international fora remained pending and would not start to be achieved until almost 
nine years later on the back of a political pact with the PSOE. From 2011, Basque 
provincial treasury representatives would start to participate alongside their Spanish 
state counterparts in three key ECOFIN working groups addressing fiscal questions 
relevant to the competences afforded to the Basque provinces by the Concierto.  
             From the PNV’s perspective, the obstacles both PP and PSOE central 
governments erected to the Basque participation in ECOFIN were more political than 
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technical in nature, forming part of the Spanish state’s broader reluctance to give the 
ACs a voice and legal standing within the European sphere. Technical experts 
working in the Basque provincial treasuries argue that participation in such fora is 
appropriate and even imperative since Basque fiscal competences are directly affected 
by European legislation, and suggest Spain should look to other federal and 
decentralized countries in Europe (e.g. Germany, Belgium and Austria) which have 
taken steps to regulate the participation of their regions or federal provinces in such 
spheres where relevant to their competences.21     
           Beyond strictly technical fora such as the ECOFIN working groups, the PNV 
ultimately aspires to secure the right to Basque representation within the Spanish 
delegation in the ECOFIN meetings themselves, which are more political in nature 
(making any agreement with the Spanish state in this regard even less likely). It also 
seeks representation in other international fora on fiscal matters such as the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). There is no 
common ground between this outlook and that of the main statewide parties, which do 
not consider the need for Basque representation in ECOFIN and other international 
fora an unequivocal given. Even the Basque federation of the PP does not consider 
Basque representation in ECOFIN necessary since the Basque provincial treasuries 
are subject to wider Spanish fiscal legislation.22  
            Aside from the question of representation in fiscal matters in Europe, the PNV 
also aspires to be less subject to Spanish legislation in areas of tax structure and 
regulation where the Basque institutions remain subordinate to the Spanish treasury.23 
Some suggest the Basques should have the right to design their own tax system and 
structure, in contrast to the current system whereby the Basque provinces are subject 
to the Spanish tax system and structure: everytime Spain creates or modifies a tax, it 
must then negotiate the degree of autonomy the Basques will have in collecting and 
regulating the tax in their territories. Similarly, although indirect taxes – most notably 
VAT – are to a large degree harmonized throughout Europe, as long as member states 
retain some small margin for manoeuvre there are calls for the Basque provincial 
treasuries to be able to vary their VAT rates in direct response to European legislation 
rather than being subject to the additional intermediary of Spanish legislation. Again, 
such proposals fit with the viewpoint that suggests the Concierto should be developed 
to give the Basques the same fiscal competences as Spain itself, in stark contrast to 
the perspective of the Spanish statewide parties which see the Concierto strictly as a 
form of fiscal decentralization within Spain. Indeed, the Basque nationalists suggest 
developing a model of fiscal harmonization between the Basque Country and Spain 
under which both have equal levels of fiscal competence could serve as a model for 
fiscal harmonization at EU level between member states.24  
 
Have bilateral relations helped to resolve differences? 
 
            The VAT negotiations in 1985 were one of the first acid tests of the 
Concierto’s adaptability to a changing regulatory context through bilateral 
negotiations: the Spanish treasury was initially opposed to the Basque request to 
transfer the responsibility for VAT collection to the Basque provinces citing technical 
difficulties, but came to accept the Basque proposal including their suggested 
adjustment rate.25 From then onwards, VAT (and later excises too) in the Basque 
region would be collected by the Basque provincial treasuries and then undergo an 
adjustment to compensate for the difference between how much they actually collect 
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and how much they are owed, since VAT is a tax on individual consumption but 
collected through a tax on corporate production.        
            Nevertheless, such instances where substantial differences of opinion over 
how to develop the Concierto have been resolved using technical arguments first and 
foremost, without one side simply ceding ground to the other in light of other 
contextual or political factors, have been very rare in the decades since the Concierto 
of 1981 was approved. Such agreements have only tended to be reached on relatively 
minor issues or on the reduced number of more substantial issues where both sides 
have held a very similar position from the outset of negotiations, as in the case of the 
decision taken by the PP-led absolute majority Spanish government and the PNV-led 
Basque government to make the Concierto a permanent rather than time-limited 
agreement for the first time under the 2002 law. In almost all the major questions, 
strong differences between the Basque and Spanish delegations in terms of their 
conceptualization of the Concierto have made it impossible to find a common middle 
ground and thus prevented agreements until if and when other contextual factors 
(usually political support or alliance arrangements) have led one side to accept the 
other’s proposal as part of a pact. This section analyses the fundamental impact of 
various factors on the ability or not of the Basque and Spanish delegations to resolve 
disagreements relating to the main areas of contention introduced previously. 
 
Political pacts and alliances  
 
           Either formal coalition or more usually informal support arrangements between 
statewide parties and the PNV have proved the primary facilitator of agreements over 
the Concierto since the 1980s, enabling the Basque nationalists to develop the model 
as desired in return for supporting other statewide party policies or goals. The role of 
mutual bargaining and support arrangements between Spanish governments and 
regionally-based parties is well documented26 but less so in relation specifically to the 
development of the Concierto. In particular, major agreements were reached with the 
PSOE majority Spanish government in 1987 as part of a deal to enable the Partido 
Socialista de Euskadi (PSE, Basque federation of the PSOE) to form a Basque 
coalition government with the PNV, and subsequently under the PP minority Spanish 
government of 1996-2000 and the PSOE minority Spanish governments of 2004-2008 
and 2008-2011, when the statewide parties needed the PNV’s support in the Spanish 
parliament.  
           After the Concierto had been approved in 1981, significant Basque-Spanish 
differences over its development set in almost immediately. The Concierto legislation 
had set a provisional quota for the first year of its application (1981) but stipulated 
that a five-yearly quota law should be agreed thereafter to prescribe the methodology 
for calculating the quota. A draft law for the first five-year period (1982-1986) was 
meant to be presented by July 1981, but no agreement was reached then or in the 
following years due to Spanish-Basque discrepancies over both the imputation index 
(6.24%) and the valuation of the competences the region was due to assume (such as 
health and social services), among other issues. By late 1986, none of the provisional 
quotas from 1981 onwards had been reconciled, the quota law still had not been 
approved, and the transfer of competences was frozen due primarily to financing 
disputes. And yet all of these issues would be resolved in 1987 when the PSE formed 
a coalition government with the PNV and the socialist government in Madrid 
conceded to the PNV’s wishes in return, fundamentally accepting the valuations and 
methods of calculation proposed by the nationalists. The deal was a political one 
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struck directly with prime minister Felipe González, effectively bypassing his treasury 
minister Carlos Solchaga. By compromising on the Concierto and the quota, the 
socialists could ensure the stability of the PSE-PNV Basque coalition, bring the PNV 
into the fold of Spanish state governance and emphasize their achievement of a 
Basque-Spanish understanding that had not been possible under a one-party PNV 
government.27 
           Following the years of socialist government in Madrid, the PNV made rapid 
progress in developing the Concierto once the PP had won power for the first time in 
1996 but without an absolute majority. Under an agreement in May 1997, the 
authority to collect special taxes and non-resident taxes was assigned to the Basque 
provinces for the first time and they were also granted significant regulatory 
autonomy over some other taxes – most notably personal income tax (Impuesto sobre 
la Renta de las Personas Físicas, IRPF) – which they had previously only collected.28 
These developments formed a crucial part of the package of measures that the PNV 
agreed with the PP, in return for which the PNV supported the investiture of José 
María Aznar and promised to provide legislative support for his minority government 
in the Spanish parliament thereafter.  
           Once the PP had won an absolute majority for the first time in 2000, however, 
the tables turned. During the 2001 negotiations for a new Concierto agreement, it was 
the Basque side – now lacking in bargaining power – that failed to secure its proposal 
that the Basque institutions should participate in ECOFIN working groups and 
meetings. The beginnings of such participation would not finally be agreed until 2010, 
when the minority socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero needed the 
PNV to support its 2011 budget and in return allowed the Basque provincial treasury 
representatives to start to participate alongside their Spanish state counterparts in the 
relevant ECOFIN working groups. Similarly, it was only when the minority PSOE 
government needed PNV support for its 2010 budget that it finally changed its stance 
and supported the afore-mentioned Ley de Blindaje in return, which was then swiftly 
pushed through and passed on 19 February 2010.  
           Nevertheless, such pacts have not always been followed through in their 
entirety. When the 2007-2011 quota law was designed, a dispute emerged as to how 
much the Basque government should receive of the funding provided by the Spanish 
government to ACs under the common financing system for (1) extraordinary 
financing (i.e. beyond the original budget allocation) for the health system; (2) 
extraordinary financing to develop the Education Law (in this case, in relation to 
children aged under three); and (3) a new dependency law. The debate was further 
complicated by opposition from some sectors, most notably the PP (even including its 
Basque federation), to giving the Basques any share of the extraordinary financing for 
competences already transferred since they usually pay for such competences with 
their own taxes. Echoing the debates in the 1980s over the valuation of the Basque 
share of health and social services, the PSOE government argued the Basque region 
should receive an amount of funding in proportion to its population size rather than 
the 6.24% share (matching the imputation index in the quota) proposed by the Basque 
delegation, but the nationalists won the argument since the PSOE needed their 
support. 29  The PSOE nevertheless backtracked on the 6.24% agreement almost 
immediately, and debate on this subject dragged on thereafter, continuing under the 
subsequent majority PP government that came into power in 2011.  
           At the time of writing, none of the quotas since 2007 have been settled due to 
continuing Basque-Spanish government discrepancies over this and several other 
unresolved issues and no agreement has been reached on a new quota law for the 
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period from 2012 onwards (the 2007-2011 one has simply been rolled over). The 
occurence of two absolute majority PP governments since 2000 has clearly reduced 
the PNV’s bargaining power, but the failure to resolve differences over the 2007-2011 
quota law under the PSOE-led minority government before the PP returned to power 
in 2011 would suggest that resolving differences over the Concierto is not always 
feasible even under minority Spanish governments seeking PNV support in 
parliament. Beyond the question of parliamentary alliances, agreeing the development 
of the Concierto has arguably become more problematic in recent years than in 
previous decades due to the emergence of other exacerbating factors, which the 
following section addresses.  
 
Party ideology, inter-regional competition and economic crisis 
 
            The PNV and Basque technical experts involved in Concierto-related 
negotiations observe essentially the same levels of opposition from both PP- and 
PSOE-led Spanish governments towards proposals to update the Concierto to give the 
Basques growing fiscal autonomy and sovereignty within Europe, unless the PNV has 
political bargaining power.30 From this perspective, both statewide parties are accused 
of sharing the same politically centralist ideology regarding the role of the Spanish 
state in international affairs. In terms of economic ideology, however, differences 
between the PSOE and PP have historically impacted the development of the 
Concierto. The afore-mentioned agreement in 1997 to give the Basques a significant 
degree of regulatory autonomy over IRPF was not only for politically expedient 
reasons but also reflected the PP’s support at the time for the hypothesis that fiscal 
corresponsibility encourages fiscal discipline. Under the previous socialist 
government, a white paper on fiscal corresponsibility had been commissed and 
presented by a technical delegation in 1995, in response to calls from some regions 
(most fundamentally Catalonia) with a view to reforming the common financing 
regime. In response, the new PP government proposed to start by sharing IRPF with 
the regions first. In 1996 it granted some regulatory autonomy over IRPF to the ACs 
under a reform of the common financing regime, while the agreement with the 
Basques over the Concierto followed in 1997. Only the PSOE genuinely did not agree 
with the move and attempted to block it, arguing that different income tax rates in 
different regions of Spain threatened equality and efficiency.31  
            Nevertheless, the PP has since taken a u-turn to become more centralist in 
economic affairs (as well as other policy areas such as education), advocating 
recentralization as a form of rationalization, in particular in response to the poor fiscal 
discipline of many regions under the common financing regime that became apparent 
during the financial crisis and given the need to comply with EU budgetary targets. 
Comparisons between the decisions taken by the PNV and the PP before and after the 
turn of the century reveal how both have increasingly moved towards opposite ends of 
the centralist-autonomist spectrum in their attitudes towards fiscal matters, which in 
turn reduces the possibilities for agreement over the Concierto’s development. While 
the PNV originally only sought the ability to collect rather than regulate the main 
indirect taxes (as seen in the VAT negotiations of the 1980s), it now aspires to the 
greatest regulatory autonomy possible in both direct and indirect taxes. Meanwhile, 
the PP has moved from advocating the sharing of taxation powers with the regions 
back in the 1990s to looking to recentralize fiscal control in some respects, for 
example by proposing to take away the power of regional governments to create their 
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own taxes (a power already limited in practice by legal challenges presented by the 
Spanish state towards any such taxes created). 
            This ideological shift on the part of the PP has coincided with the growing 
criticism from other ACs in Spain and also more recently from UPyD towards the 
Concierto. Although the Concierto is bilateral in nature, it is far from immune to 
wider inter-regional pressures and tensions. For most of the 1980s and 1990s the 
Concierto was the subject of relatively little attention and even less envy from other 
regions given the level of responsibility that tax collection entails, which helped to 
create the conditions for purely Basque-Spanish bilateral agreements. But this 
situation would start to change around the turn of the century as reports on the fiscal 
balances of the regions with the Spanish state emerged suggesting many regions under 
the common regime were getting a poor deal and as Catalonia began to raise demands 
for a bilateral financing arrangement. During the economic boom years when the 
central government had sufficient funds to do so, it could partly keep tensions at bay 
by reforming the common financing regime in ways which consistently promised to 
increase each region’s resources beyond the status quo, but the last such reform in 
2009 proved immediately insufficient as the financial crisis fully set in. The severe 
strain the common financing regime came under only served to increase long-standing 
criticism from other regions towards the “exceptionalism” of the Basque and 
Navarran economic agreements.       
           This climate has compounded the reluctance of Spanish governments 
regardless of their political colour to develop the Concierto any further and to allow 
for any change that might result in a reduction of the quota. For example, a major 
source of discrepancy which has contributed to the longstanding stalemate at the time 
of writing over the settlement of quotas since 2007 and the lack of a new quota law 
for the period 2012-2016 concerns Basque calls to revise the methodology to calculate 
the rate to update the quota (índice de actualización). Each five-yearly quota law 
establishes a base year quota and a rate to update it thereafter based on the increase 
(or decrease) in the state collection of taxes covered by the Concierto agreement 
elsewhere in Spain. The 2007-2011 quota law stipulated that the rate would be subject 
to revision following the reform of the common financing regime in 2009 since this 
could affect it, but the Spanish government has so far not heeded Basque requests for 
negotiation in this regard. 
 
Conclusion 
 
           The bilateral relationship governing Spanish-Basque fiscal relations has come 
under increasing strain. During much of the 1980s and 1990s the Concierto was 
developed extensively and disagreements with Spanish governments over the model’s 
evolution and annual quota payments tended eventually to be resolved in a way which 
aligned with the PNV’s proposals, but the political and regulatory environment 
subsequently evolved. Since the turn of the century, the behaviour of both the 
conservative and socialist statewide parties has clearly suggested they consider the 
development of the Concierto to have gone far enough, in contrast to the PNV which 
sees the growth and consolidation of the EU regulatory context as a prime opportunity 
to develop the Concierto further as a tool of fiscal sovereignty within Europe. Political 
pacts and alliance arrangements between the PNV and the Spanish statewide parties 
became the main facilitator of agreements over the Concierto from the 1980s onwards 
but they have become increasingly difficult to secure in the face of other exacerbating 
factors such as the PP’s ideological shift towards recentralization, inter-regional 
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competition for resources and the economic crisis. The mere fact of a bilateral 
relationship, while understandably preferable from the Basque perspective to the 
alternative of a relationship determined unilaterally by Madrid or subject to inter-
regional agreement, has not in itself been able to reconcile increasingly different 
conceptions of the Concierto – a problem exacerbated by the absence of any 
consensus over the wider question of the degree of autonomy or even sovereignty to 
afford the Basque region in a political sense. These different conceptions cannot 
easily co-exist in a loose relationship of mutual tolerance between Spanish and 
Basque governments. The development of the Concierto necessarily involves phases 
of renegotiation or changes de facto as a result of extraneous developments, which 
will inevitably continue to bring different conceptions of it into conflict. 
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